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Background: Financial issues are major barriers for rural-to-urban migrants accessing tuberculosis (TB) care in China.
This paper discusses the effectiveness of providing financial incentives to migrant TB patients (with a focus on poor
migrants in one district of Shanghai using treatment completion and default rates), the effect of financial incentives
in terms of reducing the TB patient cost, and the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of the intervention.
Results: Ninety and ninety-three migrant TB patients were registered in the intervention and control districts
respectively. TB treatment completion rates significantly improved by 11% (from 78% to 89%) in the intervention
district, compared with only a 3% increase (from 73% to 76%) in the control district (P = 0.03). Default rates
significantly decreased by 11% (from 22% to 11%) in the intervention district, compared with 1% (from 24% to 23%)
in the control district (P = 0.03). In the intervention district, the financial subsidy (RMB 1,080/US$170) accounted for
13% of the average patient direct cost (RMB 8,416/US$1,332). Each percent increase in treatment completion costs
required an additional RMB 6,550 (US$1,301) and each percent reduction in defaults costs required an additional
RMB 5,240 (US$825) in the intervention district.
Conclusions: Overall, financial incentives proved to be effective in improving treatment completion and reducing
default rates among migrant TB patients in Shanghai. The results suggest that financial incentives can be effectively
utilized as a strategy to enhance case management among migrant TB patients in large cities in China, and this
strategy may be applicable to similar international settings.
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Background
China has the second largest TB burden in the world,
with the prevalence of active TB cases in rural areas
twice that of urban areas [1]. Increasing population mo-
bility has become one of the major challenges in TB
control, especially with more than 200 million people* Correspondence: zgy1021@hotmail.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the ormoving from rural areas to more prosperous urban areas
in recent years [2]. The Chinese residency permits sys-
tem is one where each newborn child is assigned a rec-
ord known as a hukou, which is in accordance with the
residence status of the child's parents. Local financing of
public services is allocated according to the number of
hukou holders in the particular local area migrants are
thus less entitled to the local social securities and public
services [3-5]. Migrants often take unstable and low paid
jobs in informal sectors such as restaurants and con-
struction sites.
Shanghai is one of the largest and most developed cit-
ies in China. In 2010, Shanghai had a population of 23
million, with 9 million internal migrants. Prevention and
control of TB within the migrant population is a great
challenge – 50% of all TB cases in Shanghai in 2007, for. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Table 1 Demographics of migrant TB patients in the
intervention and control districts
Variables Intervention Control
Subjects 90 93
Male (%) 48 (53) 58 (62)a
Average age 30 34b
Married (%) 44 (49) 51 (55)c
Education: illiterate and semi-literate (%) 10 (11) 12 (13)d
Employment: informal sector
(labor intensive and service industry) (%)
70 (78) 81 (87)e
Have medical-related insurance in Shanghai (%) 14 (16) 21 (23) f
aχ2 = 1.531,P = 0.216;bZ = 0.759,P = 0,448;cχ2 = 0.649,P = 0.421;dχ2 = 0.139;
P = 0.709;eχ2 = 2.753, P = 0.097;fχ2 = 1.459, P = 0.227.
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the migrant TB patients defaulted from treatment and
the cure rate was much lower than that of permanent
residents [6].
In Shanghai, TB services are provided by an integrated
system consisting of a lung clinic in the designated district
general hospitals, the TB dispensary (normally integrated
with control services of sexual diseases, HIV/AIDS and
leprosy) at the Center for Disease Control (CDC), and the
disease prevention departments in the Community Health
Centers (CHCs). The lung clinic in the designated hospital
provides TB diagnosis and treatment in line with the
national TB control guidelines [7]. TB patients, or those
suspected to have TB, who have had a cough lasting for
more than two weeks are referred to the lung clinic, which
then reports the case to the TB dispensary. The TB dis-
pensary is responsible for the public health tasks of TB
control, such as staff training and case supervision. At the
guidance of the TB dispensary, health workers in the CHCs
provide treatment supervision and follow up with patients
during the systematic TB case management process known
as DOTS (Directly Observed Therapy Short Course).
Free treatment is provided to TB patients who are
registered in the TB dispensary regardless of their hukou
status. The free treatment policy covers the costs of the
whole course of first line anti-TB drugs, and basic exam-
inations including sputum smear and culture, chest
X-ray, and blood profiles for liver function. Patients have
to pay upfront and then claim reimbursement upon
completion of the whole treatment. The policy does not
cover hospitalization costs, second line anti-TB drugs, and
any other drugs or medical examinations. In Shanghai,
TB patients pay all medical costs, keep the receipts and
are reimbursed all the costs covered by the free treatment
policy at the end of their treatment.
Poor adherence to TB treatment can result in treatment
failure, generate multidrug resistance (MDR) TB cases, and
increase TB transmission in the community [8,9]. Treat-
ment adherence is related to patient's socio-economic
factors, health system barriers, and compliance to the treat-
ment regiments [10,11]. In China, poor adherence to TB
treatment is associated with heavy financial burden, lack of
social support, side effects of drugs, and patient’s mobility
[12]. Despite China’s free treatment policy, financial costs
were found to be the most cited reasons for TB treatment
default [13]. Our qualitative study in Shanghai confirmed
that financial barriers were the biggest factors causing
default in migrant TB patients [4].
Among the various interventions [14-16], financial
incentive is one of the most commonly implemented and
evaluated methods to improve TB treatment adherence
[17]. Use of financial incentives has proved to be beneficial
in TB treatment completion among vulnerable popula-
tions such as prisoners [18,19], homeless populations[20-22], and drug users [23-26]. However, most of the
experiences have been limited to the prophylactic treatment
of latent TB. Although interventions may often target poor
TB patients, they do not conduct a systematic process of
poverty evaluation, thus compressing the impact for pov-
erty elevation in such programs [27,28].
No studies to date have been published regarding the
policy and practices of providing financial incentives to
migrant TB patients, especially poor migrants in large
cities. In this paper discusses the effectiveness of provi-
ding financial incentives to migrant TB patients (with a
focus on poor migrants in one district of Shanghai using
treatment completion and default rates), the effect of
financial incentives in terms of reducing the TB patient
cost, and the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of the
intervention.
Results
Background characteristics of subjects
During the study period, there were 90 and 93 TB
patients registered in the intervention and control dis-
tricts respectively. In the intervention district, there were
81 (90%) new patients (i.e. patients who had no previous
treatment) and there were 82 (88%) new patients in the
control district (P > 0.05). No extra-pulmonary cases or
severe cases such as coughing with blood were found in
migrant TB patients registered in the two districts dur-
ing the study period. No significant difference was found
in gender, average age, marriage status, employment sta-
tus, education and insurance status of migrant TB
patients between the two districts (P > 0.05, see Table 1).
Based on the questionnaire undertaken with partici-
pants, 70 (78%) migrant TB patients in the intervention
district and 56 (60%) migrant TB patients in the control
district were assessed as living in poverty. Of the poor
136 migrant TB patients in the intervention district,
46 (66%) received the subsidy of RMB 1,000; while
80 (89%) of all the migrant TB patients received the
transport incentives of RMB 80. Among the 24 (34%)
Table 2 Cost of treatment for new TB patients in the
intervention and control districts
Variables Intervention Control
No of subjects 52 43
Male (%) 31 (60) 25 (58)a
Average age 30 35b
Married (%) 25 (48) 13 (30)c
Education: illiterate and semi-literate (%) 3 (5.8) 5 (12)d
Employment: informal sector
(labor intensive and service industry) (%)
35 (67) 35 (81)e
Have medical insurance in Shanghai (%) 9 (17) 10 (23)f
Average per capita annual family income (RMB) 27,194 22,124g
Average annual family income (RMB) 53,004 53,605h
Direct cost (RMB) 8416 9743i
Direct medical cost (RMB) 5929 6902j
Direct non-medical (RMB) 2487 2841k
Transportation cost (RMB) 290 262l
Food and accommodation (RMB) 246 485m
Nutrition cost (RMB) 1950 2094n
Direct cost/annual family income (%) 16 18
aχ2 = 0.021, P = 0.884; bZ = −1.277, P = 0.202;cχ2 = 3.123, P = 0.077;dFisher’s exact
test, P = 0.461;e χ2 = 2.409, P = 0.121;fχ2 = 0.520, P = 0.471;gZ = −0.969, P = 0.333;
hZ = −0.565, P = 0.572;i Z = −1.436, P = 0.151;jZ = −1.028, P = 0.304; kZ = −1.537,
P = 0.124; lNZ = −0.345, P = 0.730; mZ = −0.260, P = 0.795; nZ = −0.931, P = 0.352.
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20 (83%) declined to receive it, while 4 (17%) returned
to their hometowns upon poverty assessment.
Treatment completion rates
Compared with baseline data, treatment completion
rates of migrant TB patients improved in both districts
during the study period (see Figure 1). A statistically sig-
nificant increase of 11% in treatment completion rate
was observed in the intervention district (78% to 89%,
χ2 = 4.745, P = 0.03), while no significant increase was
observed in the control district (73% to 76%, P = 0.56).
The increase of treatment completion rates in the inter-
vention district was significantly higher than that in the
control district (11% vs. 3%, p = 0.03).
Default rates
A total of 10 migrant patients defaulted in the intervention
district, with 7 (70%) of these defaulting within the first
month of treatment. A similar situation was reported in
the control district, with 13 (62%) defaulting in the same
period. Both districts observed reduced default rates of all
the migrant TB patients after the intervention as com-
pared with the baseline data (see Figure 1). The reduction
in default rates was statistically significant in the interven-
tion district (22% to 11%, χ2 = 4.254, P = 0.04), but not in
the control district (24% to 23%, P = 0.80). The reduction
of default rates of all patients in the intervention districts
was significantly larger compared with that of the control
district (11% vs. 1%, P = 0.03).
Effect of financial incentives
The number of patients who completed their treatment
was 73 (90%) and 65 (79%) of new migrant TB patients
in the intervention and control districts respectively. Of
these, 52 (71%) of the patients in the intervention dis-
trict and 43 (66%) in the control district completed theFigure 1 Treatment outcomes of migrant TB patients in the
intervention and control districts.questionnaire about their financial burdens (see Table 2).
This relatively low response rate was likely due to the
mobile nature of migrants. The proportion of direct cost
accounted for 16% and 18% of the average annual family
income in the intervention and control districts respect-
ively. In the intervention district, the financial subsidy
(RMB 1,080/US$170) accounted for 13% of the average
patient direct cost (RMB 8,416/US$1,332). The transpor-
tation incentive (RMB 80/US$13) over the treatment
period accounted for 28% of the patients' average trans-
portation costs (RMB 290/US$46).
Incremental cost-effectiveness analysis
In total, this project involved an investment of an add-
itional RMB 52,400, which consisted of RMB 46,000 of
financial subsidy and RMB 6,400 of transport incentives.
This additional cost prompted an increase of 8% in treat-
ment completion rate in the intervention district as
compared to the control district. This suggests that for
each percent increase in treatment completion, an add-
itional cost of RMB 6,550 (US$1301) was invested in the
intervention district. Similarly, this additional cost deliv-
ered a reduction of 10% in the default rate in the inter-
vention district compared with the control district,
showing that an additional cost of RMB 5,240 (US$825)
was needed to reduce each percent in default rates
(see Table 3).
Table 3 Incremental cost-effectiveness of the intervention
Intervention Control
Incremental cost (RMB) 52,400 0
Treatment completion rate:
Baseline period (%) 78 73
Project period (%) 89 76
Incremental effect (%) 11 3
Net incremental effect (%) 8 -
Incremental cost per increase of 1% treatment




Baseline period (%) 22 24
Project period (%) 11 23
Incremental effect (%) 11 1
Net incremental effect (%) 10 -
Incremental cost per decrease of 1% default
rate, when compared to the control arm (RMB)
5240
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Our study showed that providing financial incentives to
migrant TB patients was effective in improving treatment
completion and reducing default rates. Our early qualita-
tive study found that financial constraints were substantial
barriers to the provision of TB services among migrant
patients in Shanghai [4]. This study also suggests that pro-
viding financial incentives reduces the access barrier for
migrants and contributes to treatment completion. In the
intervention district, the financial assistance provided to
migrants accounted for a significant proportion of their
medical costs, transportation costs, nutrition and food,
and accommodation costs associated with treatment, and
was especially beneficial for the poor patients. Tulsky et al.
suggests that cash incentives, such as the ones used in this
study, may be more effective than non-cash incentives in
improving treatment adherence [21]. However, cash
incentives also have limitations. Patients may use this to
purchase items such as alcohol and cigarettes, which may
in turn inadvertently affect treatment results [29,30]. How-
ever, we did not find evidence of this in our study.
Our study also found that providing the financial sub-
sidy in four installments during the course of the treat-
ment was effective as it appeared to motivate patients to
complete their treatment. Another study found that
monetary incentives were effective in improving adher-
ence to TB treatment, however, this was limited to the
first follow-up appointment in homeless individuals only
[22]. Davidson et al. found that the improved adherence
to TB treatment was attributed to the financial incen-
tives which were distributed on a progressive and cyc-
lical basis with a bonus at the end of each cycle period
[31]. Although Davidson’s model may be a better way tomotivate the completion of treatment, it is too compli-
cated to apply in routine busy practice. In our study, the
monetary incentives, working as performance rewards
[32], were given to migrants in stages when they had to
renew their drugs. This was proved to be just as effective
as Davidson’s model.
Our study found that, in both districts, the majority of
the migrant TB patients were living in poverty. In the
intervention district, the majority of the poor patients
received a financial subsidy of RMB 1,000. The study
proved that our simple process of poverty evaluation is
feasible and patient-friendly, which is an important step
in ensuring the appropriate distribution of financial
incentives [27,28]. Our project suggests that it is feasible
to engage community-based health workers, especially
as they are closer to the migrant residents and have the
responsibility of following up with TB patients.
In this study, 11% of the patients in the intervention
district defaulted from treatment, while a large propor-
tion of patients defaulted within one month of registra-
tion despite the incentives. This may be due partially to
a delay in conducting the poverty assessment and dis-
tributing the financial incentives. This again highlights
the importance of timely and appropriate administration
of financial incentives for the scheme to be successful
[27,31]. However, given the higher living costs in
Shanghai and the lack of family support for migrants,
the financial subsidy may not be sufficient to attract
patients to stay in the city to complete their treatment.
Our earlier study showed that patients who did not own
any property in Shanghai, and/or were unemployed
because of TB, were likely to return to their hometown
upon diagnosis for better family support and care [4].
The post-reimbursement procedures of TB treatment in
Shanghai and the profit-seeking behaviors of public
hospitals may also add greater financial burdens for TB
patients during their treatment [4].
Our study found that an additional cost of RMB
6,550 (US$1301) is needed in the intervention district
to achieve a 1% increase of treatment completion,
and an additional cost of RMB 5,240 (US$825) is
needed for a 1% decrease of default rates as com-
pared to the control district. If these financial incen-
tives are to continue, the government will be required
to provide this additional funding. However, given the
financial capacity of Shanghai and other similar cities,
as these costs are relatively small, they should not
pose an obstacle to reducing TB transmission in
migrants and local residents.
This project was designed to be embedded in exist-
ing TB services, that is, no extra staff time was
required in TB clinics and CDCs. In the meantime, a
similar project funded by the Global Fund to Fight
Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)
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increased clinical hours and appointed new staff, in
addition to providing financial incentives to migrant
TB patients. Further economic evaluation is being
conducted to compare the effects of two different
ways of providing financial incentives to migrant TB
patients elsewhere.
China is building a harmonious equitable society. Our
study may contribute to a policy change for providing the
general social protection system for migrants in Shanghai
and other large cities in China. Various government sec-
tors, such as health insurance, civil affairs, and TB control
can be mobilized to replicate this program.
This study had a few limitations. Firstly, it had limited
generalizability as it was conducted in one big city,
resulting in a test pool of a relatively limited number of
migrant TB patients. Nevertheless, the study has
detected a significantly statistical difference on treatment
completion rates and default rates, and therefore this
may provide an insight for migrant TB control in similar
settings. Secondly, nearly a quarter of the poor patients
did not receive the financial subsidy in the intervention
district. This may be due partially to program adminis-
tration problems and to the fact that poor patients were
reluctant to receive public support. Thirdly, our study
was conducted in the context of the increasingly
improved TB control efforts and outcomes. However,
the improvement effect can be largely balanced by com-
paring the control and intervention districts during the
same period. To our knowledge, no other policies or
economic changes could be taken into account that may
influence the treatment of the migrant TB patients at
that time. Finally, due to the mobile nature of migrants,
only around 70% of the new migrant TB patients com-
pleting treatment were able to complete the question-
naire about their financial burdens. Our study may be
subject to recall bias as patient direct non-medical costs
were collected from patient surveys as no other methods
of data collection were available. However, patient direct
medical costs in TB clinics were collected from patient
charts review. Furthermore, the study was conducted
shortly after patients' treatment completion to minimize
recall bias.Conclusions
Overall, the study can conclude that financial incentives
proved to be effective in improving treatment comple-
tion and reducing default rates among the migrant TB
patients in Shanghai. The results suggest that financial
incentives can be effectively utilized as a strategy to en-
hance case management among migrant TB patients in
large cities in China and this may be applicable to simi-
lar international settings.Methods
Interventions
A controlled before-and-after design was employed to
investigate the effectiveness of financial incentives on
treatment completion and default rates among all the
migrant TB patients. The intervention commenced in
October 2007 and was conducted in one district of
Shanghai. In the intervention district, each migrant TB
patient received RMB 10 (US$2) (1US$ = 6.35 RMB) per
month for transportation to encourage them to visit the
TB clinic in the designated hospital. In addition, a living
subsidy of RMB 1,000 (US$157) was provided to poor
migrant TB patients. The intervention was designed to
fit into the routine practices and job descriptions of the
health providers from the CDC, TB clinics in the desig-
nated hospitals, and CHCs. The migrant TB patients
were informed of the availability of the financial incen-
tives upon diagnosis in the TB clinics. The trained health
workers from the CHCs met the migrant TB patients
upon registration, assessed their poverty status (using a
standard questionnaire), and provided the financial
incentives to them. Each community has a team of com-
munity health workers, including one or two general prac-
titioners and three to four nurses. The team provides
integrated primary health care and public health services
to the residents in the communities. The salaries of com-
munity health workers are fully provided by the govern-
ment. Community health teams have the responsibility of
taking care of their catchment population and carrying
out routine check-ups at patient homes. Community
health workers usually have a good knowledge of local
communities and know the local residents. Standard TB
treatment includes an initial intensive phase (to kill the ac-
tively growing bacilli, lasting 2 months), and a continu-
ation phase (to sterilize by destroying all the bacilli, lasting
4 months for newly treated cases and 6 months for
retreated cases) [7]. According to the current require-
ments, community health workers visit TB patients, re-
gardless of their residency status, twice a month in the
intensive phase and once a month in the continuation
phase (the subsequent four months of standard TB treat-
ment for newly treated cases, and 6 months for retreated
cases). Therefore, community health workers are the most
appropriate people to assist in the intervention process.
Based on the results of our exploratory study [4],
migrant TB patients who owned a commercial property
in Shanghai or whose family earned twice the minimum
level of income set by the Shanghai Government in 2005
[33], were classified as non-poor. Migrant TB patients
who did not own a property and earned less than the
Shanghai minimum income were defined as poor.
Migrant TB patients who did not have a property and
earned less than twice but higher than the Shanghai
minimum income were asked questions regarding
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their rent accounted for more than a third of their family
income. Migrant TB patients who answered yes to any
of these questions were defined as poor (see Figure 2).
The subsidy was given in four cash installments: RMB
300 (US$47) at the time of diagnosis, RMB 300 (US$47)
at the end of the second month of treatment, RMB 200
(US$31) at the end of the fourth month of treatment,
and RMB200 (US$31) at the end of treatment.
Another district was selected as the control district,
where patients were given the usual care and no financial
incentives were given specifically for migrant patients
whose poverty status was also assessed. In both districts,
the TB DOTS program (encompassing the standard and
free treatment of TB as described previously) was applied
to all TB patients, including the migrants. District names
were made anonymous to protect their identities.
Evaluation
Data were collected through routine TB registers in both
districts for patients who were enrolled at two 15-month
time periods, i.e. the baseline period of 1 July 2006 to 30
September 2007 and the study period of 1 October 2007
to 31 December 2008. All the migrant TB patients who
were diagnosed in the intervention and control districts
during the above periods were registered regardless of
whether the treatment had begun or not. To evaluate
the effectiveness of the intervention, treatment comple-
tion rate was used as the primary outcome and default
rate was used as the secondary outcome. Treatment
completion rate is defined as the proportion of migrantFigure 2 The poverty assessment tool for migrant TB patients.TB patients who have successfully completed treatment
among all the migrant TB patients, including smear posi-
tive and negative patients, new patients and retreated
patients, who registered during the study period. The de-
fault rate is defined as the proportion of migrant TB
patients who defaulted from treatment (i.e. in the begin-
ning or during any stage of the treatment) among all mi-
grant TB patients registered during the study period.
Definitions regarding treatment completion rates and de-
fault rates are in line with the international and national
guidelines [7,34]. It is hypothesized that providing finan-
cial incentives improves TB treatment completion and
reduces defaults among the migrant TB patients in the
intervention district compared with the control district. A
variance in difference analysis was conducted regarding
the increase of treatment completion rates and reduction
of default rates between the two districts.
The proportion of MDR TB is usually used as an indi-
cator for case mix of TB patients. However, drug sensi-
tivity analysis was not routinely conducted for TB
patients at the time of research. As the retreated cases
had a much higher chance of being MDR cases [35], we
compared the proportion of new patients as an indicator
of case mix in the two study districts.
In the fall of 2009, a face-to-face questionnaire survey
to investigate the cost of the TB treatment in both dis-
tricts was conducted with migrant TB patients who had
not been treated previously and enrolled in the two dis-
tricts during the project period. Patient direct medical
costs in TB clinics were collected from medical charts,
while direct non-medical costs including transportation,
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TB treatment were collected from patient recalls. The
aim of the costing analysis was to help understand the
financial burden of the migrant TB patients and the
effect of the financial incentives in terms of relieving
their financial burdens.
A facility survey was conducted to collect the project
cost from the CDC. This included the financial subsidy
received by the poor TB patients and transportation
incentives received by all the TB patients. The incremen-
tal cost-effectiveness ratio was calculated to analyze,
from the project perspective, the additional cost of hav-
ing one more percent of patients completing treatment
or reducing one percent of patients defaulting from
treatment.
Data were analyzed using SPSS 14.0 (USA). Statistical
analysis for the primary outcome employed a generalized
linear model fitted with a binomial outcome and logit
link function, permitting an effect for the district and for
the intervention. Data were analyzed using intention to
treat analysis. The effect of financial incentives in terms
of reducing the TB patient cost was estimated and so
was the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of the
intervention:
Incremental cost effectiveness ratio = additional cost of
intervention/[increase of treatment completion rate
(reduction of default rates) in the intervention district-
increase of treatment completion rate (reduction of
default rates) in the control district]
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